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Cooksey v. Futrell: The Fourth Circuit Illustrates How
Informal Communications by State Authorities and Regulators
Can be Used to Establish Article III Standing and Ripeness in
First Amendment Proceedings
Neal A. Inman*
The lack of a clearly articulated standard for the use of informal
communications in achieving standing and ripeness in First Amendment
proceedings has had a negative impact on one blogger's fight against a
state agency. After a serious health incident, Warren Cooksey decided to
ignore his doctors' dietary advice and use his own eating plan, eschewing
traditional dieting for a low-carbohydrate, high-protein "paleo" diet.
After experiencing dramatic weight loss and significant health
improvement, he began to advocate this unconventional plan via his own
personal website and give personalized advice on how to follow this
plan. Due to these activities, Cooksey soon came into conflict with the
administrative state, specifically the North Carolina Board of
Dietetics/Nutrition which told him through informal phone calls, emails,
and letters that his activities were unacceptably close to the unlicensed
practice of dietetics. Rather than meekly accepting this pronouncement,
Cooksey has sought to challenge the legality of this restriction on First
Amendment grounds. However, Cooksey's challenge has been troubled
by the unclear standards that plague standing issues in First Amendment
jurisprudence.
This Note analyzes some of the standing issues raised by
Cooksey: the use of "informal" government communications to establish
Article III standing and ripeness in First Amendment speech
proceedings. Cooksey eventually followed the trend of similar cases,
maintaining that informal government communications were sufficient to
establish standing and ripeness for a First Amendment challenge because
the communications at issue met certain criteria. Namely, the
communication gave a well-founded basis for Cooksey to fear a future
individualized harm if he continued his expressive activities and
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2015;
Staff Member, FirstAmendment Law Review.
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constituted a sufficient chill on his activity to create a ripe issue for the
courts to consider. However, this Note also finds that there has not been
a clear statement by courts as to when an "informal" communication
with regulated entities is sufficient to establish standing in "preenforcement" First Amendment free speech cases. Because the case at
hand deals with the constitutionality of a state law as it applies to the
plaintiff, this Note does not consider the topic of "overbreadth"
.2
standing.
Because of difficulties encountered in Cooksey and other cases
where plaintiffs had to deal with unclear standing and ripeness issues in
First Amendment cases involving informal government action, this Note
proposes a framework that fits within the jurisprudence surrounding this
issue to date. Once a plaintiff has met this framework, he has shown
both standing and ripeness for the purposes of First Amendment cases.
Simply stated, a plaintiff bringing a First Amendment action
must show that an agency or official has communicated with her through
unofficial or informal means about the consequences of expressive
activity. This direct communication shows an individualized, directed
threat to the plaintiff. The plaintiff can then use that communication to
establish both standing and ripeness, but only if that communication
would convey to a reasonable person that the plaintiffs activity would
attract future adverse action from the government. This potential future
adverse action establishes an objectively reasonable chill on the
plaintiffs speech and allows him to establish both an injury in fact and a
1. Within this paper, the term "informal" is used in a somewhat similar fashion
to "informal agency action," which is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as agency
"activity other than adjudication or rulemaking, such as investigation, publicity, or
supervision." See INFORMAL AGENCY ACTION, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 849
(9th ed. 2009). However, because the scope of this paper includes actions outside of
agency activity as well as agency activity that is not expressly authorized by statute
or other regulation, a more accurate definition for the term "informal" as used in this
context comes from the Random House dictionary: "not according to the prescribed,
official, or customary way or manner; irregular; unofficial." See INFORMAL,
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY (2013).
2. For insight into the Supreme Court's stance on "overbreadth" standing, see
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
3. Standing and ripeness analysis often blend together in First Amendment
cases due to the interlocking issues and the relaxed standards for each in freedom of
speech cases compared to normal standards. See Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1206
n.2 (4th Cir. 1986).
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ripe challenge. Although never officially articulated by the courts, this
Note establishes that this test is in line with previous decisions.
Analysis proceeds in five parts. Part I will present the factual and
procedural background of Cooksey. Part II will explore Article III
requirements generally and in the context of the First Amendment. Part
III will analyze related cases which have dealt with issues of informal or
hypothetical government actions and will propose a test for the
usefulness of informal communication. Part IV will analyze different
approaches and establish why the proposed test is useful for
understanding Cooksey. Finally, Part V will briefly synthesize Parts I-IV
and conclude the analysis.
I. BACKGROUND
A. FactualBackground: Cooksey's "Cave Man" Conversion

Like many Americans, Steve Cooksey had an inactive, sedentary
lifestyle that caused significant health issues.4 Cooksey's poor health
habits pushed him to an unhealthy weight, which he claims reached
nearly 235 lbs. at his heaviest point.5 His lifestyle had consequences for
his health in 2009, when Cooksey was rushed to the hospital because his
insulin levels were so unhealthy that he was nearly in a state of diabetic
shock.6 He was placed on a daily insulin injection program in order to get
his diabetic issues under control, and he was advised to adopt a high
carbohydrate, low protein diet.7 Rejecting the path advised by his
doctors, Cooksey instead adopted a high protein, low carbohydrate diet
along with a strenuous exercise regime.
Cooksey's diet plan undeniably produced dramatic results: he
claimed to have lost 78 lbs. and he was cleared by his doctor to stop daily
insulin injections.9 Still tinkering with his meal plans, Cooksey
eventually adopted one version of a low-carb, high-protein diet known as
the Paleolithic or "caveman" diet which is named after its alleged
4. See Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 229-30 (4th Cir. 2013).

5. Id.
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 230.

9. Id.
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resemblance to the diet available to early humans. Cooksey became a
zealous advocate of this meal plan through his "Diabetes Warrior"
website. This website had several sections.12 In part, the website was
diet-related advocacy. It also included his personal testimonial regarding
the effects of his "caveman" diet and an advice column addressing
readers' specific dietary concerns. Cooksey also offered a fee-based
service where he would advise dieters and give personal
encouragement. 13
Cooksey's advocacy attracted the attention of the North Carolina
Board of Dietetics/Nutrition (the "State Board"), the official state body
regulating and licensing the practice of dietetics.14 The State Board's
executive director contacted Cooksey, informing him that a complaint
had been filed against him for violating North Carolina's laws regulating
nutritionists and the practice of dietetics. The relevant statute prohibits
the practice of dietetics/nutrition without a license from the State
Board.15 Unlicensed individuals cannot practice "[a]ssessing the
nutritional needs of individuals and groups, and determining resources
and constraints in the practice setting" or "[e]stablishing priorities, goals,
and objectives that meet nutritional needs and are consistent with
available resources and constraints." 16 The State Board is charged with
enforcing these provisions.
Instead of pursuing the complaint through adjudication methods,
the State Board and its subsidiary complaints committee contacted
Cooksey in a variety of informal ways to state that they considered his
actions to be in violation of the North Carolina Dietetics Statute. 18 This
informal action included a "red pen" review, where the Executive
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Notably, it is unclear from the opinion whether or not Cooksey actually
attracted any customers.
14. Id.
15. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-365 (2013).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-352(4)(a-b) (2013).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-356 (2013).
18. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-356(5) (2013) (providing that the State Board
shall "[c]onduct investigations, subpoena individuals and records, and do all other
things necessary and proper to discipline persons licensed under this Article and to
enforce this Article.").
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Director showed Cooksey printed off pages from his website and marked
various sections of the website that she found problematic.19 Cooksey
20
appears to have complied with the suggestions, at least to some extent.
Yet, at no time did the State Board proceed with any type of formal
21
adjudication of the complaint against Cooksey.
B. The Cave Man Dieter Goes to Court
Cooksey's issues attracted the attention of several libertarian
organizations.22 The Raleigh, North Carolina, based John Locke
Foundation and its Carolina Journal publication shed a public light on
23
Cooksey's situation. The Institute for Justice, a public interest law firm
focusing on economic liberty issues, agreed to represent Cooksey in a
24
First Amendment-based challenge to the State Board's actions.
Assisted by the Institute for Justice, Cooksey filed suit in federal
court. His complaint alleged that the North Carolina statute regulating
nutritionists and dietary advice violated the First Amendment's Speech
Clause, both on the statute's face and as-applied to him.25 The case was
filed in federal court in the Western District of North Carolina. 2 6
However, Cooksey's case was not initially successful.27 The district court
granted the State Board's motion to dismiss Cooksey's challenge on the
28
grounds of lack of injury and ripeness.

19.
20.
'because
21.
22.

See Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 23-32 (4th Cir. 2013).
Cooksey alleged that he had "reluctantly complied with this request
he feared civil and criminal action against him."' Id. at 231.
See id. at 231-32.
See Sara Burrows, State Threatens to Shut Down Nutrition Blogger,
CAROLINA JOURNAL ONLINE (April 23, 2012), http://www.carolinajoumal.com

/exclusives/displayexclusive.html?id=8992; Brian Balfour, Not So Free Speech,
CIVITAs REVIEW (Sept. 27, 2012), http://civitasreview.com/miscellaneous/not-so-

free-speech/.
23. See Burrows, supranote 22.
24. See id.
25. See Cooksey, 721 F.3d at 233.
26. Id. at 232.
27. See Cooksey v. Futrell, 3:12-CV-336-MOC-DSC, 2012 WL 4756069
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 29, 2012), affd, 3:12CV336, 2012 WL 4756065 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 5,

2012), vacated, 721 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2013).
28. See id.
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C. The DistrictCourt'sAnalysis
In dismissing Cooksey's complaint, the district court found the
lack of formal action significant to its analysis.29 The court elaborated
that "the Board made no formal determination concerning whether
Plaintiffs
conduct constituted
the unlicensed practice
of
dietetics/nutrition. Plaintiff merely received informal guidance from a
Board committee and the executive director based on their review of his
website." 30 Making no mention of the Board's "red-line" mark-through
analysis and edits, the Court stated that Cooksey "volunteered" to edit his
website to comply with the Board's orders.
The district court found that none of the Board's actions
"suggested any limitation on [Cooksey's] expression of his opinions,"
saying that he "voluntarily complied with the suggestions made by the
Complaint Committee and removed parts of his website that were
,,32
problematic.
The district court also noted that Cooksey had not taken
advantage of a procedure in the North Carolina dietetics/nutritionists law
that allowed the board to give advisory opinions at the request of the
applicant.33 As a result, the district court found that Cooksey had not
established an injury in fact or a ripe claim; thus, he did not have a basis
34
for a challenge in the federal courts.
The district court's repeated use of terms such as "suggestions"
and "voluntarily," along with its characterizations of both the Board's
and Cooksey's actions, showed the court's disregard for the impact of
informal actions on expressive activity.35 The district court apparently
could not see how phone calls and emails could impact the exercise of
First Amendment rights.36 Remarkably, the court's analysis does not
discuss First Amendment doctrine, failing to mention "chill" or the
37
generally lowered standards for these types of cases.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See id. at *3-4.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id.
See id. at *4 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-4 (2011)).
Id. at *4.
See id. at *3.
See id at *1-4.

37. Id These issues will be discussed in Parts II and III of the Note.
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D. The Fourth Circuit Reverses the District Court

Cooksey appealed the district court's ruling. A three-judge
panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision,
finding that Cooksey had standing to challenge and that the issues of his
case were ripe.39 Unlike the district court, the Fourth Circuit's analysis
explicitly considered Cooksey's claim under the "somewhat relaxed"
40
standards utilized in First Amendment cases.
The court declined to discuss the merit of the non-Article III
issues of Cooksey's claim, despite the State Board's contentions that
regulation of Cooksey's speech was clearly within the bounds of its
authority. 41 The court stated that the State Board's arguments "put the
merits cart before the standing horse" and thus could not be used to
support dismissing the case for lack ofjusticiability.42
Cooksey had sufficiently met the burden of showing a justiciable
"injury in fact" due to his self-censorship after being contacted by the
board.43 His injuries were thus more than merely "hypothetical."44 The
court also analyzed the ripeness question in a similar method, reasoning
that "[o]ur ripeness inquiry, however is inextricably linked to our
standing inquiry," and also found for Cooksey on this element.45
The court looked to three specific actions of the State Board in
making its determination: the phone call directly from the "highest
executive official" who referenced her statutory authority to bring action
against Cooksey if he did not comply; the "red-pen mark-up" and its
accompanying statement; and the letter from the State Board informing

38. See Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 234 (4th Cir. 2013). Retired
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was part of the three judge panel. Id.
at 229.

39. See id. at 241.
40. See id. at 235 ("[S]tanding requirements are somewhat relaxed in First
Amendment cases . . . .").
41. See id. at 239.
42. Id. (quoting Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1093

(10th Cir. 2006)).
43. Id. at 235.
44. Id. at 237 ("A person of ordinary firmness would surely feel a chilling
effect-as Cooksey did.").
45. Id. at 240.
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Cooksey that his situation would continue to be "monitor[ed]." 46 The
court thus concluded that Cooksey had faced "a non-speculative and
objectively reasonable chilling effect of his speech due to the actions of
the State Board." 47 Since it found that Cooksey had sustained an injury in
fact, the court quickly dispensed with the requirements of causation and
redressability. 48
Moving on to the ripeness of the claim, the court disagreed with
the State Board's argument that, because it had not taken any actions
against Cooksey yet, it had not determined whether the state statute
applied to his online activity. 49 Utilizing analysis as it did with standing,
the court looked to the language of the State Board's communication
with Cooksey and found that the State Board had used threatening
language against him.50
The court stated that the Board had "already, through its
executive director, manifested its views that the Act applies to Cooksey's
website, and that he was required to change it in accordance with the redpen review or face penalties."5 The court said that this use of threatening
language meant that the Board had actually already determined that
Cooksey's actions were prohibited under the statute, and thus found
52
Cooksey's claim ripe for adjudication. Having found both standing and
ripeness, the court concluded that Cooksey's claim met the requirements
for judiciability and remanded the case for review on the merits by the
district court.53
II. ARTICLE III ISSUES
To better understand the issues that were relevant in Cooksey, it
is helpful to explore the background of Article III standing and ripeness
requirements in federal courts. There are looser requirements for both

46. Id. at 236-37.
47. Id. at 236.
48. Id. at 238.
49. See id. at 240.
50. See id. at 241.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. At the time of this Note's publication, the district court has not ruled on
the substance of Cooksey's complaint.
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standing and ripeness in First Amendment cases that complicate this
analysis. Since this jurisprudence is somewhat unclear about how to
handle informal communications from agencies (like the situation in
Cooksey), this section will also look at how analogous situations were
treated in the courts.
A. Standing in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence

Article III of the United States Constitution provides for federal
jurisdiction only where disputes have matured into "cases" and
"controversies." 54 This "case-or-controversy" doctrine "identifies
disputes appropriate for judicial resolution."5 5 The Supreme Court has
referred to this as a "fundamental" and "bedrock" principle of the federal
judiciary. As part of this principle, federal courts place the burden on
the plaintiff to establish standing in his or her case.57 A plaintiffs case
will not be heard if his or her claims are "imaginary or speculative."
The Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife590Xplicitly lays out a tripartite test for meeting this standing
requirement.6 0 According to this test, the plaintiff must first establish that
he has sustained an "injury in fact."61 This injury must be "an invasion of
a legally protected interest" which is both "concrete and particularized"
and "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."' 62 Secondly,
there must be a causal link between the conduct complained of and the
injury sustained by the plaintiff. This injury must be "fairly traceable" to

54. U.S. CONST. art. Ill. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962) ("In
the instance of lack of jurisdiction the cause either does not 'arise under' the Federal
Constitution, laws or treaties (or fall within one of the other enumerated categories
of Art. III, § 2), or is not a 'case or controversy' within the meaning of that section;
or the cause is not one described by any jurisdictional statute.").
55. Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 2006).
56. See Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996).
57. See Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 234 (4th Cir. 2013).
58. See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298
(1979).
59. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
60. Id. at 560.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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63

the defendant's alleged actions. The actions must not be those of
64
outside parties other than the defendant. Third and finally, it must be
likely (as opposed to merely speculative) that the injury sustained by the
61
plaintiff will be remedied by the court's favorable decision.
However, in cases involving First Amendment claims, courts
66
have a more relaxed view of standing requirements. The Supreme
Court applies this lower standard because government actions have the
potential of "chilling" expressive activity in our democratic society.
The Supreme Court has held that "the concern that constitutional
adjudication be avoided whenever possible may be outweighed by
society's interest in having the statute challenged."6 8 This relaxed
standard primarily affects the first prong of the standing test: "an
invasion of a legally protected interest," also known as the "injury in
fact" requirement. 69
In order to satisfy this element in First Amendment cases, a
plaintiff must generally show "self-censorship, which occurs when a
claimant is chilled from exercising her right to free expression., 7 0
Although this relaxes the strictness of normal, federal standing doctrine,
it is not a carte blanche for First Amendment plaintiffs to use
hypothetical situations as a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs must show that the government threat to their speech presents a
"specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm." 7 1
The Supreme Court has specifically and emphatically stated that mere
"subjective chill" is not a basis for standing.72
In order for a plaintiff to have standing to challenge government
actions in First Amendment cases, she must show self-censorship which
was caused by a specific governmental threat of future or actual
63. Id. at 590 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
751 (1984)).
64. Id. at 562.
65. Id. at 560.
66. See Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947,

956 (1984).
67.
68.
69.
70.

See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
See Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. at 956.
See Benham v. City of Charlotte, N.C., 635 F.3d 129, 135 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id.

71. Laird,408 U.S. at 14.
72. Id. at 13-14.
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government activity. Since standing is a threshold question, courts do not
consider the merits of the underlying complaint or the likelihood of the
plaintiffs success, because doing so would be putting "the merits cart
before the standing horse." 73
B. Ripeness

Ripeness analysis considers "(1) the fitness of the issues for
judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration."74 Like standing, ripeness analysis is relaxed in the First
Amendment context.75 Because of these relaxed requirements, the
Cooksey court stated that in its case, "standing and ripeness should be
viewed through the same lens." 76 "First Amendment rights . . . are
particularly apt to be found ripe for immediate protection, because of the
fear of irretrievable loss. In a wide variety of settings, courts have found
First Amendment claims ripe, often commenting directly on the special
need to protect against any inhibiting chill." 17
C. Using "Informal" Communication

While this First Amendment framework seems relatively
straightforward at first blush, its application can be somewhat confusing,
especially in the context of government enforcement activity that has not
yet occurred. In fact, the first Supreme Court case to identify the
inadequacy of a mere "chilling effect," Laird v. Tatum,7 8 dealt with
precisely this issue. In Laird, several American groups that were under
military surveillance brought a class action suit, stating that the military
activity had a chilling effect on the exercise of their First Amendment
rights.7 There, the Court held that a subjective fear of future action was

73. See Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1093 (10th
Cir. 2006).
74. Nat'1 Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003).
75. Cooksey, 721 F.3d at 240.

76. Id.
77. Id (citing New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495,

1500 (10th Cir.1995)).
78. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
79. Id. at 3.
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not enough to establish standing under the "case or controversy"
requirement of the Constitution.80 These subjective 'chills' are not
sufficient to replace a "specific present objective harm or a threat of
specific future harm," because "the federal courts established pursuant to
Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions." 8' By
analyzing subjective chills, the courts would be inappropriately crossing
the line into those forbidden advisory opinions.
In Fourth Circuit courts, two other cases involving these
"informal" government actions have reached two very different decisions
despite factual similarities to the issues presented in Cooksey.82 While
initially discordant, the results point toward the existence of something
of a test for similar cases dealing with informal government actions. To
summarize this test: First, the plaintiffs must show that they are in the
class of individuals that could be harmed by the future government
action. Second, the plaintiff must show that they are under an
individualized threat for the law's enforcement. 8 4
In the first case, North CarolinaRight to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett,ss
the Fourth Circuit faced the question of whether a North Carolina state
law regulating electioneering activities unconstitutionally infringed upon
86
the rights of an issue advocacy group. The challenged law stated that
groups seeking to influence elections must register with the state and file
certain reports or face legal consequences. 87 A pro-life group that
distributed voting guides based on politicians' views on abortion issues
utilized a provision in the law that allowed interested parties to ask for
guidance from the state authority. The group asked whether its planned
voter guide mailings would fall under the scope of forbidden activities.
After the head of the elections authority replied that the asked-about
80. See id. at 13-14.
8 1. See id.

82. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999); Int'l
Acad. of Oral Med. & Toxicology v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 451 F. Supp.
2d 746 (E.D.N.C. 2006).
83. See Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 710.
84. See Int'l Acad. Of Oral Med. & Toxicology, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 753.

85. 168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999).
86. Id. at 705-06.

87. Id. at 712 (citing N.C.
88. Id. at 709.
89. Id.

GEN. STAT. §

163-278.7(b) (2009)).
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actions appeared to be within the scope of the statute, the group filed suit
in federal court, challenging the law on First Amendment grounds.90
There, as in Cooksey, the Fourth Circuit quickly rejected the
state's argument that there was no case or controversy at hand. 9 1 North
Carolina claimed that it had not yet formally interpreted the plaintiffs
actions to be illegal and disclaimed any intentions of prosecuting the
theoretical activity.92 However, the court found that the plaintiffs fell
within the scope of regulated activity within the terms of the statute.93
Furthermore, there was evidence of an individualized harm or threat to
the group.94 Significantly, they had written to the state board, and stated
that their correspondence established a well-founded threat against their
planned activities.9 5 As a result of that threat, there was an actual chilling
of speech, despite the lack of formal enforcement of the law against
North Carolina Right to Life. 96
The Fourth Circuit was not impressed with North Carolina's
argument that it did not interpret the statute to encompass North Carolina
Right to Life's activity.97 The court found that this argument was
"nothing more than the State's promise" that North Carolina would
98
pursue the group for violating of the law. Without a statutory,
regulatory, or judicial guarantee, the group would "suffer from the
reasonable fear that it can and will be prosecuted." 99 Thus, the Fourth
Circuit found that North Carolina Right to Life was a group within the
regulated class, and had experienced a particularized threat that had
chilled its expressive activity.o00
In this analysis, the state regulator's "informal" opinion served
as substantial proof that they considered the group's activities to be
within the reach of its authority because the informal opinion was aimed
at stopping their activity. If the state authorities had not determined
90. Id.
91. See id. at 711.
92. See id. at 710.
93. See id
94. Id.
95. See id at 711.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 710-11.
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whether or not they considered the expressive activity to be within the
scope of their authority, they would not have sent a letter that stated
otherwise.o Since the state authorities believed that they could regulate
the group's activity, the letters then served to prove that an objective
person would view this as a credible government threat.102
On the other hand, in InternationalAcademy of Oral Medicine &
Toxicology v. North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners,io3 a
dental group's First Amendment challenge to a North Carolina
prohibition on certain types of dental advertisements failed. 104 There, the
North Carolina dental regulator had published a list of "Do's and Don'ts"
regarding dental advertising in one of its periodical publications.'0 o This
list in part contained several statements such as "Don't advertise that you
practice 'Mercury-Free Dentistry,' 'Metal-Free Dentistry,' or that you
should 'Eliminate your exposure to Mercury,' or that 'Silver fillings
contain mercury that may leak into your body and cause health
06
problems,' or make any reference that mercury fillings are harmful.,,1
Mercury related advertisements were not banned by statute or regulation,
and the dental regulators had never issued any formal prohibition against
this type of activity.107 However, a broader regulation did give the
regulator authority to prohibit false or misleading advertising through
regulations and enforcement actions. 08
A group of dentists who practiced mercury- and metal-free
dentistry then wrote to the state regulator, asking whether their
advertisements would be prohibited.109 The head of the regulating body
stated that the agency had never prosecuted a dentist who had advertised
that he had a mercury- or metal-free practice as long as that statement
was accurate.' 10 Unlike the communication in Cooksey or North Carolina

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
451 F. Supp. 2d 746 (E.D.N.C. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 749.
Id.
See id.at 750.
See 21 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 16P.0101 (2013).
SeeInt'lAcad of Oral Med., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 751.
Id.

COOKSEY V. FUTRELL

2014]1

681

Right to Life, the regulator did not threaten any regulatory action or
indicate that it considered the dentists' activity to be problematic."'
The dentists then filed suit in federal court, which rejected their
claims for a lack of ripeness.11 The district court decided to give the
North Carolina regulator time to interpret the statute before ruling on the
constitutionality of its application to the plaintiffs.' 13 The court reasoned
that: "[p]ostponing consideration in this case has the advantage of
permitting North Carolina authorities to construe governing North
Carolina statutes and regulations."I1 4 Further, "[h]ow the state authorities
construe these provisions could 'materially alter the question to be
decided.'""

Thus, the court gave different weights to the regulators' two
different informal communications.' The "Do's and Don'ts" list was
treated dismissively, while the letter from the regulating agency was
treated with deference.117 Despite the fact that the plaintiffs were dentists,
and thus within the scope of the statute, the letter established that they
were not under any particular threat of enforcement action from the
regulator." 8 As a result, the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a harm,
which then prevented them from establishing ripeness. 119
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Berry v.
Schmittl20 shows that a plaintiff can beat back standing and ripeness
challenges if government communications are directed at her
individually and threaten her harm if she continues her expressive
activity. In Berry, an attorney had received a "warning letter" from the
Kentucky Bar Association Inquiry Commission after the attorney had
publicly criticized the handling of an investigation by a legislative ethics
commission. 121 The Commission communicated to the plaintiff that it
believed that he had violated rules governing professional conduct by
111. See id.

112. See id. at 752.
113. See id. at 751-52.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. at 752.
See id. at 746-51.
See id.
See id. at 751.
See id. at 755.
688 F.3d 290, 295 (6th Cir. 2012).
See id. at 294-95.
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attorneys.122 The regulation at hand prevented attorneys from making
"[a] statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless
disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or
integrity ofajudge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer."' 23
That letter, as well as a second "supplemental" letter, also
warned the plaintiff against continuing his criticisms.124 The letter was
apparently not a method of formal discipline, and would be destroyed
after one year in the attorney's file.125 In his complaint challenging the
Bar's actions, the attorney alleged that he wished to continue in his
critiques of the legislative commission, but the letter from the Bar
Association had chilled his speech.126
The Sixth Circuit determined that Berry had sustained an injury
in fact because he "received what amounts to a credible threat of
enforcement" in the form of the warning letter.127 Much like in North
Carolina Right to Life,128 the Sixth Circuit rejected the Kentucky Bar
Association's claims that it would not pursue enforcement despite its
letter indicating the contrary.129 The Sixth Circuit also rejected the
Kentucky Bar's contention that it had not issued a formal determination
about the plaintiff, stating that "[t]he injury here is not actual discipline,
but rather chill caused by the threat of discipline." 130 Again, the court
never stated this rationale in the form of a test, but merely utilized the
communications as part of an analysis of whether there had been an
objectively reasonable "chill" of the plaintiff's speech. '" In sum, the
Sixth Circuit used the Kentucky Bar Association's warning letters to

122. Id.
123. Id. at 295 (quoting Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.130(8.2(a))).
124. See id. at 297.
125. Id at 295.
126. Id. at 297-300.
127. Id. at 297.
128. See North Carolina Right v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 711 (4th Cir. 1999)
("NCRL is left, therefore, with nothing more than the State's promise that NCRL's
officers will face no criminal penalties if NCRL distributes its voter guide without
registering as a political committee. NCRL's First Amendment rights would exist
only at the sufferance of the State Board of Elections.").
129. See Berry, 688 F.3d at 297.
130. Id. at 298.

131. See id at 297 ("Given the current KBA position, it would be reasonable
for Berry not to rely on the KBA's promises regarding future enforcement.").
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establish that the plaintiffs expressive conduct would
result in future
13 2
disciplinary action if continued, an "injury in fact.,
III. FIRST AMENDMENT "RETALIATION" CLAIMS WITH ANALOGOUS
SITUATIONS

Considering the relative paucity of similar cases, it may be
helpful to look at First Amendment retaliation jurisprudence for
guidance. These cases involve retaliatory government action in response
to a critic's expressive activity.133 Unlike Cooksey, these cases are not
generally about the questionable extent of a statute or regulation. 134
Instead, these cases are about persons in power who will use other
retaliatory mechanisms in the government's arsenal to retaliate against
the speaker.13 In both retaliation cases and in cases like Cooksey,
government officials often convey their retaliatory intent through
informal or "off the cuff' comments.
In retaliation cases, the Fourth Circuit utilizes a three-pronged
test to analyze the validity of the claim.136 First, there must be a showing
that the expressive activity is protected.13 Second, the plaintiff must
show that the alleged retaliation negatively affected his or her expressive
activity. Analysis of the second element utilizes a reasonableness test
to see whether a plaintiffs expressive activity was chilled due to a
government official's actions.139 Third, there must be a causal
relationship between the plaintiffs expressive activity and the
government's retaliation.'4 0

132. See id at 296-98.
133. See Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 528 (4th Cir. 2006)
(discussing the three-part standard for retaliatory government action claims).
134. See id.
135. See id. at 528 ("Rather, because the alleged retaliation is in the nature of
speech, we must first determine whether Manchin's remarks were threatening,
coercive, or intimidating so as to intimate that punishment, sanction, or adverse
regulatory action will imminently follow.") (footnote omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
136. See Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 686 (4th Cir. 2000).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 528 (4th Cir. 2006).
140. Id.
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In Blankenship v. Manchin,141 the Fourth Circuit considered a
claim brought by a coal mining executive, Don Blankenship, who had
spent a considerable amount of his personal funds opposing a major bond
initiative that was supported by West Virginia's Governor Joe
Manchin.142 At a public appearance supporting his initiative, Manchin
made a public statement, recorded in a local paper, that he thought
increased government scrutiny of Blankenship would occur as a result of
his activity against the bond measure, saying "I think that [additional
scrutiny] is justified now, since [Blankenship] has jumped in there [the
bond debate] with his personal wealth trying to direct public policy." 4 3
Blankenship brought a claim in federal court alleging that his
companies were being targeted by West Virginia regulators as a result of
these comments.144 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found it
reasonable to view Manchin's statement as a threat of imminent adverse
regulatory action against Blankenship in retaliation for his expressive
activity. The specific alleged retaliation was heightened regulatory
scrutiny of Blankenship's business.14 5 Despite the "off the cuff' nature of
Manchin's remarks, the court found that Manchin's words confirmed that
146
his opponent was targeted as a result of his expressive activities.
Conversely, in Baltimore Sun Co. v. Ehrlich,14 7 the Baltimore
Sun unsuccessfully brought suit alleging retaliatory action from the
Maryland Governor's Office as a result of its investigative pieces.148
There, the only alleged injury was that state communications officials
refused to return the plaintiff s phone calls and declined to speak with the
newspaper outside of public press conferences and public records

141. 471 F.3d 523 (4th Cir. 2006).
142. See id. at 525.
143. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ken Ward Jr., Manchin Still Sparring
over Pension Bond Bid, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 18, 2005, at 6C).
144. Id. at 527.
145. See id. at 526-27 ("On June 30, 2005, the West Virginia Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) approved a Massey permit application to build a
coal silo in Raleigh County, West Virginia. Despite the approval, Manchin allegedly
ordered members of his staff to meet with DEP and other regulatory officials to
investigate possible safety concerns with regard to the silo site.").
146. See id. at 530.
147. 437 F.3d 410 (4th Cir. 2006).
148. Id. at 421.
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requests.149 Because the Tenth Circuit found the Governor's retaliation a
"de minimis inconvenience," it refused to let the claim go forward since
the plaintiff could not show an actionable claim.150 While this is not
exactly the same as the "injury in fact" in the previously discussed cases,
the analysis is similar because there has to be more than a "de minimis"
inconvenience to the party involved. 15
Outside of official press releases and press conferences, reporters
depend on relationships with government officials for information.
However, the court refused to find that these relationships and the
privileges they bring are a "right" belonging to reporters; the end of a
productive relationship is not actionable.152 The reporters here could not
show that they had been denied access to public events or that the
government had used any regulatory mechanisms against them.153 The
Tenth Circuit also found that the reporters had "not been chilled from
expressing themselves," determining that an ordinary person would not
have been chilled in that situation either. 154
Blankenship and Baltimore Sun illustrate two things about how

informal government communication can be used to establish standing
and ripeness.155 First, as in Blankenship with Manchin's comments
directed at the business leader, the government's informal
communications must be targeted at the individual plaintiff.156 However,
as Baltimore Sun illustrates in an analogous situation, individual
targeting is not sufficient, in and of itself, to establish Article III standing
because the actions taken by the government must be sufficient to cause
149. Id. at 413-14.
150. Id. at 419 ("[W]e also conclude that the adverse impact of such conduct is
objectively de minimis. It would be inconsistent with the journalist's accepted role in
the 'rough and tumble' political arena to accept that a reporter of ordinary firmness
can be chilled by a politician's refusal to comment or answer questions on account of
the reporter's previous reporting.").

151. See id. at 418.
152. See id. at 414.
153. See id. The governor's retaliatory actions seemed limited to refusing to
return phone calls or call on the journalists at press conferences, as the journalists
continued to receive information about public events and their requests for public
records were still fufilled as required under Maryland law. See id.
154. Id. at 419.
155. See Baltimore Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 437 F.3d 410, 419 (4th Cir. 2006);
Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523 (4th Cir. 2006).
156. See Blankenship, 471 F.3d at 532.
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a chilling effect. 1 7 Once targeting is established, the plaintiffs must be
able to point towards some threatened regulatory or other government
action that would come as a consequence of their speech.
In Blankenship, the plaintiff could demonstrate that Governor
Manchin's actions were backed up with official, consequential
government action through increased scrutiny of the speaker's highly
regulated coal mining interests.1 5 9 However, the Baltimore Sun reporters
could not point towards a non- "de minimis" official government action
that was taken or threatened against them. 1o This principle can be taken
into account in cases such as Cooksey. The informal speech must be
targeted towards the speaker, and it should implicitly or explicitly
include a threat that would chill the speaker from continuing his or her
expressive activity.
IV. PROPOSED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND ANALYSIS

Tying together the strands of thought from previous cases, in
cases such as Cooksey, a plaintiff bringing a First Amendment action
must show that an agency or official has communicated with her through
unofficial or informal means about the consequences of expressive
activity. The plaintiff can then use that communication to establish
standing and ripeness, but only if that communication would convey to a
reasonable person that the plaintiffs activity would attract future adverse
action from the government, chilling his expressive activity.
A. The ProposedFramework
Although never formally stated, courts consistently use informal
communications as a basis for meeting Article III requirements where
these government communications give a well-founded basis for a future
individualized harm against the plaintiff were they to continue their
expressive activities. For example, in North Carolina Right to Life, the
court used the election agency's informal opinions and communications

157.
158.
159.
160.

See Baltimore Sun, 437 F.3d at 418-19.
See Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 236 (4th Cir. 2013).
See Blankenship, 471 F.3d at 530.
BaltimoreSun, 437 F.3d at 419.
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to establish that the government considered the plaintiffs contemplated
actions to be unlawful, and as a result, the plaintiff would likely suffer
prosecution if it continued with its planned voter-guide distribution.16 In
Berry, the court used the Kentucky Bar Association's letters to the
plaintiff to establish that the plaintiff was under the threat of further
sanction from the KBA were he to continue criticizing the actions of the
legislative committee.162 In both cases, the courts rejected the authorities'
later contentions that they did not intend to enforce any measures against
the plaintiffs in the future.163
Blankenship is also illustrative even though it does not involve a
challenge to laws or statutes. 16 4 While simply an "off the cuff' remark,
Governor Manchin's prediction of government scrutiny of the plaintiffs
business interests gave the plaintiff a reasonable and established belief
that the subsequent government action was due to his expressive
activity. 16 Again, it was difficult to backtrack and state that this
16(
subsequent action was not based on Blankenship's speech activities. ,
Cooksey fits appropriately into this framework. There, the State
Board's communications directly established that the plaintiffs
Paleolithic dietary advocacy was under the regulatory scope of the State
Board's authority.'6 Communications from the Board repeatedly stated
that certain portions of Cooksey's diabetes website, specifically a "Dear
Abby"-style advice column, the paid mentoring program, and the act
of putting his Paleo-style "meal plan" on his website, were counseling
services which could not be provided in North Carolina without a license
from the State Board.169 The court rejected the State Board's later claim
that it had not yet determined the regulatory extent of its powers over
online blogs.170 The Fourth Circuit found that the State Board's
161. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1999).

162. See Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298 (6th Cir. 2012).
163. See id; N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 168 F.3d at 705.
164. Blakenship, 471 F.3d at 527-28.
165.
166.
167.
168.
individual
response.
169.
170.

See id. at 529.
Id.
See Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 237 (4th Cir. 2013).
Referring to a column where readers write to the columnist with
problems, which the author attempts to solve with a short, published
Id. at 232-33.
See id. at 231.
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communications to Cooksey showed that they considered his actions to
be within their regulatory scope and created a ripe claim for
adjudication.
The Fourth Circuit also pointed towards the specific future harm
that Cooksey could expect if he did not halt his expressive activity.72
Namely, the State Board repeatedly told Cooksey that his actions were
being monitored for future compliance. 73 Cooksey was never informed
in these communications about the uncertainty of his case or any
prospect for his activities to avoid future scrutiny due to regulatory
determinations.1 74 Rather, he was simply told, in no uncertain terms, that
his activities were not allowed under North Carolina law.175 As such, he
could point towards an objectively reasonable future harm if he
continued his activity, and as a result, he self-censored.176
B. Rationalefor Establishinga FormalFramework

Formally adopting this, or a similar framework, would have two
distinct benefits. First, there would be faster adjudication of underlying
issues, as illustrated in Cooksey, where there has not, as of the time of
publication, been a determination of the underlying issues of the
plaintiffs complaint. Cooksey, who may or may not have a valid claim,
has had to wait in legal limbo for years while standing issues are
addressed.177 Second, by making a clear statement of how to deal with
informal government actions, the courts prevent the erosion of First
Amendment standing that comes from unclear caselaw. The North
Carolina branch of the American Civil Liberty Union's amicus brief in

171. Id at 236-37.

172. Id at 236.
173. Id. at 237.
174. See id. at 236.
175. Id. at 232 (quoting an email from the Board to Cooksey: "You should not
be addressing diabetic's specific questions. You are no longer just providing
information when you do this, you are assessing and counseling, both of which
require a license.").
176. See id. at 235.
177. Cooksey's issues with the board began two years ago. See id. at 231.
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Cooksey succinctly described the future consequences of adopting the
Cooksey district court's strict standing analysis.m
As explained in the brief, an adverse ruling would have the effect
of encouraging regulators and other state entities to act similarly to the
regulators in Cooksey's case. 179 Regulators could act outside the bounds
of the law by threatening potentially protected activity with legal
consequences. To many individuals, this would seem like formal
government activity, and a large number of people would likely be
frightened by the prospect of government enforcement. Even if a targeted
individual were inclined to challenge the government, the potential costs
of a legal case would be a high barrier to plaintiffs who, unlike Cooksey,
were unable retain pro bono legal services. However, even if a plaintiff
was able to retain counsel, the government would be able to use
supposedly informal activity to block them from having the standing
necessary to access the adjudicative power of Article III courts.
These effects would be keenly felt in North Carolina, which
explicitly encourages informal conflict resolution between agencies and
citizens in its Administrative Procedures Act. 80 In its relevant part, the
Act states that it "is the policy of this State that any dispute between an
agency and another person that involves the person's rights, duties, or
privileges, including licensing or the levy of a monetary penalty, should
be settled through informal procedures."18 1 By not firmly stating how to
treat informal government actions, courts risk allowing this type of
unchecked administrative power to undermine expressive activity. In
effect, this stricter mode of analysis would encourage more informal,
quiet government acts such as the one experienced by Cooksey.
C. Potential Critiquesof the ProposedFramework
A reasonable question arises from the above analysis: if the
above cases were decided using the same objective person, "more than a
subjective chill" framework, then why should courts abandon that
178. Brief for ACLU of North Carolina Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 13-14, Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226 (4th Cir.
2013) (No. 12-2084).
179. Id.
180. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-22 (1991).
181. Id. (emphasis added).
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method of analysis for a new test? Indeed, an entire legal movement,
Legal Realism, sprung up in rebellion to what its supporters viewed as
"mechanical jurisprudence," the methodical application of tests.182
However, this Note does not advocate for mere "mechanical"
application of any sort of test. This is simply a proposed analytical
framework that would allow future courts to quickly proceed through
analysis of First Amendment standing issues involving hypothetical
government actions, advisory letters and opinions, and other informal
measures that are present in cases such as Cooksey. The broader scope of
First Amendment jurisprudence is not touched or affected because this
proposed framework is a logical extension of First Amendment
jurisprudence. Additionally, by leaving an "objective person" test within
the framework, courts will retain a considerable amount of freedom to
reject cases that might otherwise fit the framework but are facially
ridiculous.
Other critiques are possible. In a law review article discussing
the challenges surrounding pre-enforcement standing generally, David
Hardy nicely stated the dilemma posed by these standing issues:
When courts adopt too broad a view of standing,
there arises a risk that they will become enmeshed
in a debate over statutes that have no real effect.
Too narrow a view poses the danger that statutes of
dubious constitutionality will chill the exercise of
rights because no one will risk incurring criminal
penalties to test them."
This proposed analytical framework is certainly vulnerable to the
charge that it does not encompass enough types of government
communications in its consideration of what constitutes an objectively

182. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV.
605, 620-21 (1908) ("The nadir of mechanical jurisprudence is reached when
conceptions are used, not as premises from which to reason, but as ultimate
solutions. So used, they cease to be conceptions and become empty words.").
183. See David T. Hardy, Standing to Sue in the Absence of Prosecution:Can
A Case Be Too Controversialfor Case or Controversy?, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
53, 53-54 (2007).
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reasonable fear of future government action.184 For example, consider
InternationalAcademy of Oral Medicine & Toxicology v. North Carolina
Board of Dental Examiners,85 which likely would continue to result in
the denial of standing under this framework. It seems incongruous to
admit standing to individuals such as Cooksey, who have been told that
their communication is forbidden and could result in regulatory action,'
while denying standing for plaintiffs such as the one in International
Academy of Oral Medicine & Toxicology, where a list of "Do's and
Don'ts" was published with the reminder that "failure to comply with the
advertising Rules will result in disciplinary action by the Board." 87
The list included a "Don't" that directly involved the plaintiff:
"Don't advertise that you practice 'Mercury-Free Dentistry,' 'MetalFree Dentistry,' or that you should 'Eliminate your exposure to
Mercury,' or that 'Silver fillings contain mercury that may leak into your
body and cause health problems,' or make any reference that mercury
fillings are harmful." 188 However, because the warning was in a
magazine that was apparently sent to the entire North Carolina dental
practice and not to the plaintiffs specifically, plaintiffs still would not
have an objective pre-enforcement fear because the dentist himself was
not targeted specifically for enforcement or informal communication,
and the advertisement was in the form of a generalized warning.' 89 The
result for the plaintiffs seems unjust, considering that, as in Cooksey,'90
North Carolina Right to Life,19 and Berry,19 the state regulator had
effectively concluded that the practice in question (using the terms

184. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
185. 451 F. Supp. 2d 746 (E.D.N.C. 2006).
186. Cooksey, 721 F.3d at 236-37 (4th Cir. 2013) ("Cooksey was told, in
effect, that he would remain under the watchful eye of the State Board .... A person
of ordinary firmness would surely feel a chilling effect. . . .") (emphasis added).
187. Intl Acad. of Oral Med. & Toxicology, 451 F. Supp. at 749 (quoting The
Dental Forum 11 (First Quarter 2005)).
188. Id. (quoting The Dental Forum 11 (First Quarter 2005)).
189. See id. at 751.
190. See Cooksey, 721 F.3d at 236-37.
191. See N. C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 711 (4th Cir.
1999).
192. See Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 297 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he warning
letter implied a threat of future enforcement that elevated the injury from subjective
chill to actual injury.").
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"metal-free" or "mercury-free" in dental advertisements) was a clear
enough violation of state law to inform the plaintiffs of that decision via
the newsletter. 193 However, because the regulator informally
communicated with the entire practice of dentistry in North Carolinanot just the plaintiffs-and had not threatened enforcement, the plaintiffs
did not have a valid claim. 194 This seems to preclude a ripe challenge and
an injury in fact by making enforcement much more hypothetical.
Publicizing the determination to this extent would logically have
a much broader impact on more speakers than just one individual
targeted for particular scrutiny from a regulator, as in Cooksey and some
of the other cases. However, under past case law and the current
framework, the plaintiff would not be able to have standing or ripeness
because he had no particularized fear that the requirement would
prospectively be enforced against him. Thus, the dental regulator was
able to escape judicial scrutiny simply by giving vague replies to the
plaintiffs in their communications. This might have given some
assurance to the specific plaintiffs in this instance, but the rest of the
practice of dentistry in the state could have operated under the
assumption that the "Dos and Don'ts" list was a statement of official
policy that needed to be followed, potentially chilling expressive
activity.195
This effectively allows the scenario warned about by the
American Civil Liberties Union's amicus brief in Cooksey, where
regulators escape scrutiny by "clearly communicating that individual
speech runs afoul of the law, requesting its removal, and identifying legal
consequences in the absence of compliance, all without the check of
judicial review."l 96 However, this is more of a function of the nature of
Article III issues than a particular flaw of this analytical framework. By
requiring "cases or controversies" before adjudication of issues,
hypothetical questions are avoided and real justiciable harms are
addressed.197 The approach undoubtedly has problems, but because the
proposed test is a clarification rather than modification of existing
193.
the nature
194.
195.
196.
197.

Int? Acad of OralMed. & Toxicology, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 749 (describing
of The DentalForum publication).
See id. (describing the nature of The DentalForum publication).
See id.
See supra note 173.
See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1972).
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jurisprudence, its critique is beyond the scope of this Note. Allowing less
"targeted" communication to pass the standing threshold may be worth
discussing elsewhere.
Again, the proposed framework in this Note does not change
precedent; it merely clarifies it and allows faster adjudication of standing
issues in these informal communication scenarios. Although it can be
argued that the courts should adopt a more inclusive concept of First
Amendment standing, that argument is beyond the scope of this Note.
The purpose of this framework is to have a clear statement, consistent
with current jurisprudence, of how to analyze unofficial or informal
government communications. The purpose of the test is two-fold. First, it
enables courts to move beyond the initial issues in these scenarios in a
faster manner and to the heart of the substantive issues. Instead of
hearing arguments from the government on the official nature of their
actions, the courts can more quickly move on to the underlying First
Amendment issues of complaints. Second, it prevents courts from
accidentally creating misleading standards that undermine the First
Amendment, as Cooksey's case could have done had he not appealed.
This proposed analytical framework can also be criticized from
the opposite approach-that it improperly allows standing where a
regulatory body or authority has not yet made a final decision about the
applicability of existing regulations to the topic. Generally, courts tend to
give "considerable weight . .. to an executive department's construction
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer."l98 However, this
proposed test arguably turns this deference on its head by allowing the
courts to make a determination about the constitutionality of enforcing a
law on a plaintiff where the relevant agency has not yet decided if the
law applies. This could go against the very core of the Article III "case or
controversy" requirement. 99
Since Laird, the Supreme Court has not allowed "the federal
courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution" to "render
advisory opinions." 2 00 By ruling when a government agency has not yet
determined whether the statute is applicable, courts could be effectively

198. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,

844 (1984).
199. See Laird, 408 U.S. at 14.

200. Id.
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rendering those forbidden advisory opinions. In a different reading of
the State Board's actions in Cooksey's case, the informal
communications issued by the government were not threats against an
individual's freedom of speech. Instead, they were an agency's attempts
to guide citizens and entities through complex regulatory fields or to
202
warn them about from potentially problematic areas. For example, the
communications between the State Board and the plaintiff in Cooskey
could truly have been the State Board's attempt to guide an individual
through a potentially problematic area without resorting to a formal
enforcement procedure.203
Not only could this test undermine the traditional deference to
agency interpretations of statutes, it could also discourage prompt and
inexpensive resolution of claims. Instead of trying to settle issues quickly
and informally, this test would encourage regulators to bring formal
claims against individuals like Cooksey to avoid unnecessary hassle
around pre-enforcement First Amendment claims. This would result in
increased costs to the state and to individuals, an inefficient outcome,
and would also make more cut-and-dry cases take much longer to
resolve.
However, these potential concerns are somewhat allayed by
several factors. First, by retaining an "objective person" reasonableness
test to prove injury and ripeness, the test would not permit a flood of
hypothetical claims based on illogical fears of enforcement. Second,
since the communications inust be directed at individuals, regulatory
agencies could avoid most claims simply by being careful with these
types of communications. Where the agency has not made a final
interpretation regarding whether a particular activity is forbidden or not,
204
as is the case in Cooksey and InternationalAcademy of OralMedicine
& Toxicology,205 the regulatory agency could refrain from issuing letters
in the first place and avoid these types of claims.

201. Id
202. This is basically what the State Board in Cooksey alleged. See Cooksey v.
Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 235 (4th Cir. 2013).
203. See id
204. See id. at 241.
205. See 451 F. Supp. 2d 746, 751 ("In short, the Dental Board's official policy
in relation to dentists discussing mercury-related issues in dentistry (whether in an
advertisement or in a direct patient-dentist consultation) is not final.").
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Additionally, this potential critique places an undue value on
informal government actions. While these communications could save
parties time and money, they undermine a culture of transparency in
administrative agencies. Better to adjudicate claims in the open than to
silently pressure and intimidate private persons into settling cases. This is
especially true where it is unclear whether a statute even prohibits the
targeted activity. If a particular activity is not banned, government
activity that proscribes that activity is simply not going to be necessary in
the first place. The courts have no reason to encourage government
actions that curtail expressive activity. 206 This is especially true since the
government's action in pressuring individuals illustrates that the
207
government considers the activity to be prohibited.
Government
agencies should not on one hand pressure, warn, and advise individuals
on the consequences of their activity, and then be able to turn around and
208
deny the finality of those informal or advisory opinions.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the analyzed case law, including Cooksey,
supports the proposition that courts have effectively been using an
informal test when analyzing informal government actions in preenforcement cases. This test looks to how the informal communication is
used. That pre-enforcement communication must establish that the
government agency considers the questioned action to be within the
scope of prohibited or regulated activity. The communication must also
convey to the reasonable person that continuing that activity would result
in government enforcement action, and as a result, the plaintiff has
refrained from continuing his activity. Once the plaintiff establishes these
elements, standing and ripeness are met.
Formally announcing this test would be a benefit to both
plaintiffs and the courts by allowing a quicker adjudication of the
underlying issue instead of repeatedly dealing with the nature of the
government's activity. The test would also encourage government
agencies to avoid discouraging activity that was not explicitly prohibited

206. See supra note 173.
207. See Cooksey, 721 F.3d at 236.
208. Id. at 236-37.
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by statutes or regulations. Although the test is subject to criticism, it fits
within the broader framework of First Amendment jurisprudence and is a
viable framework going forward.

